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This thesis examines the relationship between weapon
system acquisition program's initial conditions (project
size, technical risk and program length) and program
outcomes in the areas of cost, performance and schedule.
The study employs a nonparametric correlation proceudre
and Mann-Whitney U Tests as the principal analytic tools
of the examination process.
The results of the analysis indicate that a definite
relationship between cost/schedule growth and program size
exists. In a significant number of cases, large programs
incurred greater absolute cost growth with less schedule
slippage than did programs of smaller size. The variance
in project technical performance is largely unexplained
by the methodology, although there are indications that
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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent draft of a revision to Department of Defense
(DOD) Directive 5000.1 suggests that the Pentagon is moving
into a new era of program management. The groundwork for
this revision to David Packard *s earlier attempt to establish
a firm policy base for the DOD procurement has been well
laid by the reports of the Commission on Government Procure-
ment and the Acquisition' Advisory Group, and by Office of
Management and Budget Circular A-109. This modification of
Directive 5000.1 places greater emphasis on the necessity
to evaluate proposed new weapon systems on the basis of
reconciled mission needs and requires an acquisition process
in which alternative concepts/solutions are investigated in
detail. The degree of program oversight by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) as proposed has been increased by
the addition of another decision milestone, "DSARC 0", at
which point the initiation of the conceptual effort will
require Secretary of Defense approval.
Faced with mounting public pressure for greater control
of costs and performance following some notable examples of
forecasting errors like the C-5A and LHA programs, DOD
appears to have responded by striving to exorcise every
possible bit of uncertainty from the conduct of weapon
system acquisitions prior to the committment of major
resources. The desired result would be the procurement of
systems which satisfy basic operational requirements by a

firm date and at a reasonable and predetermined price.
Although written several years prior to the proposed
policy update, J. Ronald Fox's words have an * I 've-seen-it-
all-before 1 air to them as he comments in Arming America on
the changing patterns of military acquisition management.
Since 196 9 there have been further attempts to
improve other aspects of weapons acquisition
management. These include the establishment of
"milestones" for major programs (i.e., dates for
the accomplishment of crucial program objectives)
;
the synchronization of management personnel
changes with program milestones; a reduction in
the numbers of letters of contract; the improvement
of training programs for program management
officials; a formal review procedure for each new
weapon system's operational specifications. The
object of the review would be to insure that
program requirements are reasonable and attainable,
and that prototype systems are developed and
tested before a production program is approved.
Serious doubts about the successful implementation
of this proposal have troubled Defense Department
observers, however. . .Many procurement officials
in the Defense Department are, after all, aware
that the present system has faults. But despite
a steady succession of studies and recommendations,
the procurement process has remained impervious to
structural reform.
1
Certainly only' time will prove Fox right or wrong, but there
is some evidence submitted by OSD that cost control has at
least received greater attention among the major programs.
1 Fox, J. R., Arming America
, p. 456, Harvard University
Press, 1974
2 in a memorandum originating in the Office of the
Director, Planning and Evaluation (OSD) dated 9 August 1976,
it was reported that weapon system cost growth had declined
generally in the last twelve months.

The purpose of this study was twofold. The first was
to establish an historical perspective of major programs
reaching fruition in the early to mid-1970 *s which will
provide a means of comparison for future studies of program
success, and thus perhaps support Fox's view. While the
meaning of "program success" might well vary, it is here
defined as the degree to which a program met initial
estimates of cost, schedule and performance criteria. The
first goal was met essentially by listing those programs
studied with their associated degrees of success in
Appendix C.
The second desired result was to investigate the validity
of certain hypotheses about program management. Specific-
ally, the approach taken in this case was to highlight gross
differences in program outcomes on the basis of shared
program characteristics, such as program size, initial
funding and technical advance. Associated with this aim was
an extensive correlation analysis in which the predictability
of program success was determined from program initial
conditions when certain variables such as service sponsor,
weapon system type and life-cycle phase were controlled.
A. UNCERTAINTY IN WEAPONS SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
A. W. Marshall and W. H. Meckling of the Rand Corporation
addressed the problem of the predictability of cost,
schedule and performance estimates associated with development
programs in a report prepared for the U. S. Air Force in 19 59.

Their conclusions regarding the uncertainty of new develop-
ments were:
1. Early estimates of important parameters are usually
quite inaccurate in two respects. First of all, they
are biased toward overoptimism, and secondly, their
error is subject to a large variation.
2. The accuracy of estimates is a function of the
stage of the system life-cycle at which time the
appraisal was made.
The authors suggested a relationship between developmental
estimates and the military world of R&D decision making,
but little if any analysis was provided in their report
other than to say that a problem in the way estimates are
generated does exist. Also, the number of programs
reviewed appeared rather small (2 2) and they were all Air
Force sponsored.
Following the above report was the work of M. J. Peck
and F. M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process: An
Economic Analysis which was published in 1962. This bell-
wether study of the business of arms procurement improved
noticeably on Marshall and Meckling's efforts to gain an
understanding of the unpredictable nature of weapons
acquisition.
A major thesis of this study is that the weapons
acquisition process is characterized by a unique
set of uncertainties which differentiates it from
other economic activity. To be sure, uncertainty
is a pervasive feature of all economic activity,
10

and most of the uncertainties in weapons acquisition
have their commercial counterparts. But there is a
uniqueness in both the magnitude and diverse sources
of uncertainty in weapons acquisition.
3
The operational definition of uncertainty was provided by
the authors as "the relative unpredicatability of the outcome
of a contemplated action".
Herein lies a problem which has confronted those
researchers who have attempted to subject the success of
program outcomes to statistical analysis based upon a
comparison of initial estimates and demonstrated performance.
Peck and Scherer summarized the difficulty in this way.
Let us begin by attempting to ascertain the degree to
which the outcomes of weapons programs are predictable.
A rough measure is obtained by examining three crucial
kinds of weapons program outcome predictions: (1) qua-
lity, or the expected technical performance and the
reliability of the resulting weapon system; (2) develop-
ment time, or the interval between the start of a
development effort and the availability of operational
weapons; and (3) the cost of development. Characteris-
tically, predictions of these variables are made by
contractors and/or buying agencies early in a weapons
program and are recorded in written documents. The
predictability of the variables can be determined by
comparing the early predictions with actual quality,
time and cost outcomes.
Nevertheless, comparisons of this sort are properly
viewed with considerable reservation, for there are
extreme difficulties in obtaining satisfactory data.
Neither the original estimates nor the final outcomes
are completely comparable between programs, nor are
they even necessarily representative of the true state
of affairs within a given program.
4
3 Peck, M. J. and Scherer, F. M., The Weapons Acquisition
Process: An Economic Analysis
, p. 17, Research Division,






The reasons given did overlap to an extent with those
reported by Marshall and Meckling.
1. Initial predictions were made at varying points
in the maturity of different programs.
2. Initial estimates were optimistically low and
in some cases deliberately inaccurate.
3. Performance outcomes could not be measured
quantitatively
.
4. Time of availability outcomes were qualitatively
assessed.
5. Cost outcomes were blurred by arcane bookkeeping
procedures, whereby developmental costs were buried
in production expenditures or post-production support.
In a criticism of the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) , the
Blue Ribbon Defense panel questioned the validity of before-
and-after comparisons futher.
The basic approach to the SAR is the establishment of
a baseline of estimated costs, schedules and technical
performance, and the subsequent measurement of the
present status against this baseline. . .Successfully
predicting the course of development of a new weapon
system is uncertain at best. The long period of time
involved introduces unpredictable changes as outside
events and circumstances shift during the five to nine
years it usually takes to acquire a new weapon. The
development process itself contains hidden unknowns.
The original estimates of cost, schedule and technical
performance of a weapon system can be made with con-
siderable skill and with total honesty, but they remain
only estimates, the worth of which can be determined
only by the future unfolding of events. The SAR's
tend to treat the original estimates as accurate pre-
dictions and to measure subsequent events in the dev-
elopment against the standard of the original estimates.
There are two serious consequences of this procedure.
12

...The overwhelming concentration now appears to be
on maintenance of the costs and schedule within the
original estimate. Concern with the quality of the
weapon and its ability to perform an essential mission
are not presented in the SAR. . .Inhibition against
change is the second serious consequence of the present
SAR system.
^
The picture is not so bleak as one would be led to
believe. Peck and Scherer pointed out the other side of
the ledger as well in their analysis of the processes of
weapons development.
To examine the effectiveness of weapons program execution
in an operational way requires a meaningful criterion of
effectiveness. One possibility is to evaluate actual
time, cost and quality results against original predic-
tions. In particular, original time, cost and quality
predictions do not necessarily reflect optimal choices.
Still, the analysis of variances from original predic-
tions has several values. For one, it is useful method
of pinpointing the problems which affect program out-
comes. Furthermore, to the extent that major national
security decisions are made on the basis of original
predictions, sizeable variances from those predictions
may imply a serious misallocation of resources.
A greater implication of the position that comparative studies
are of no utility is that without comparisons, the effective-
ness of reforming activities within the weapon system
acquisition process must be left entirely to intuition.
Peck and Scherer did attempt to pinpoint problems
affecting program outcomes by correlating Marshall and Meek-
ling 's criteria of program success with a largely qualitative
5 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Report to the President and
the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense , Vol. 1,
p. 125, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970
6 Peck, M. J. and Sherer, F. M. , The Weapons Acquisition
Process: An Economic Analysis
, p. 428, Research Division,




collection of explanatory variables. The results were
characterized by a lack of statistical significance which
might be explained by a reliance on parametric procedures.
However, the results did indicate that definite relation-
ships existed between program characteristics externally
imposed on the project, such as urgency, the importance of
minimizing costs, state-of-the-art exploitation and program
results.
This study was conceived in part as a redirected con-
tinuation of the above aspect of Peck and Scherer's work;
redirected in the sense that the choice of independent
variables was limited to quantitative measures of a program
(e.g. , unit cost, total program cost, development expendi-
tures and program length) which were then applied to a
larger sample .of programs using nonparametric analyses.
However, more importantly this thesis has attempted to
ascertain the validity of certain general beliefs of the
nature of program management and its effect on program out-
comes. Four separate hypotheses have been presented, each
in its own right questioning the predictability of project
success when considered as the result of a single determinant
variable. 8 in short, the thesis has erected a model of the
acquisition process in which the management skills and
7 Peck, M. J. and Sherer, F. M,, The Weapons Acquisition
Process: An Economic Analysis , ch. , Research Division,
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University,
1962




practices of a system's program office staff or individual
manager have been ignored as predictors of program results.
The model was further refined by suppressing the externally
imposed noise of program contractions (expansions) and
economic escalation. The hypothesis testing served to
illustrate one dimensional differences in acquisition programs
(i.e., cost growth differences in programs differentiated
by project cost alone)
.
In addition, a series of correlation tests were conducted
in which the fundamental differences in program outcomes were
further tested by controlling additional program character-
istics such as service sponsor or weapon system type. The
purpose of the correlation was twofold, first to establish
whether the controlling process accented the gross differences
identified by .the hypothesis testing, and secondly, to identify
among the program facets of size, length and risk, effective




A. SELECTED ACQUISITION REPORT
Recognizing the problem of how program maturity may
distort the accuracy of early forecasts, it was considered
essential that some instrument adjust initial estimates for
all programs to a common beginning, and also to allow for the
adjustment of these forecasts in the light of a lengthy
program life. Such an instrument was the Selected Acquisition
Report (SAR)
.
The SAR serves as a comprehensive, summary acquisition
status report for the "highest levels of management within
the Department of Defense and (is) the basis for reports to
the Congress and other government agencies including the
Government Accounting Office (GAO)". Compiled at the close
of each quarter, the SAR tracks the success of each major
weapons system acquisition in the areas of cost, technical
performance and schedule.
In each of these areas, the report offers a comparison
between current estimates for program success and the develop-
ment, or initial, estimates. Sandwiched between these two
expectations is yet a third, the approved program estimate
which in practive varies only slightly, if at all, from the
development estimate. The development estimate is established
9 Secretary of the Navy Instruction 7000.3
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once the Secretary of Defense grants his approval for the
program to move into full scale development, and generally
has as its basis the Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP)
.
The development estimate for procurement may be reviewed once
the production contract has been let, but otherwise, the
estimate may not be changed without permission of the Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) . Fox points out
the necessity of this last requirement as he quotes a DOD
review of management control practices.
This problem has been common enough to acquire the
esoteric but descriptive label, "the rubber baseline".
Translated, this means that the contractor managers
would periodically make retroactive adjustments to
cost estimates and schedules so that plans would
equal actuals. . .Obscuring overruns in this fashion
contributed to our being caught short on funding for
two major programs last fiscal year. -1-0
The approved program estimate is also based upon the DCP, or
in its absence, a Program Memorandum or Program Change
Decision. As these formal statements of changes in program
goals are forthcoming, the estimate will necessarily be
revised. The current estimate represents the program
manager's most realistic assessment of program status. As
the program matures, this appraisal will more and more equate
to demonstrated performance or the actual completion of
schedule milestones. The 31 March 1976 SAR for the A-7E
project is provided as an example in Appendix A.
The 30 June 1976 SAR was the principal, primary reference
10 Fox, J. R. , Arming America
,




source of project data for this thesis. In fact, because of
the completeness of the report and the clarity of its format,
whether or not an acquisition program was included under the
reporting system determined whether that program would be
included in the analysis. Thus, this determination excluded
a number of weapon systems presently in either development or
procurement, principally in the areas of electronic counter-
measures and naval gunnery.
B. ANALYTIC METHODS
1. Hypothesis Testing
1. Large programs have a tendency to incur greater
cost and schedule growth in absolute and relative terms than
do smaller programs .
One of the initial, underlying assumptions of this thesis was
that not only -will weapon system acquisitions experience cost
growth, but that for system with large program costs, the
growth will be correspondingly greater than for those less
expensive projects. Reasons for the explanation of the cost
growth phenomenon have been postulated again and again by
critics of military procurement (e.g., Peck and Sherer, Fox).
Not the least frequently observed reason is that of over-
optimism. It would seem reasonable that large, expensive
programs would require a certain amount of "selling" on the
part of sponsors to ease the difficulties of higher level
DOD and Congressional approval. This "selling" often took
the form of understating the eventual program cost, and with
18

it the technological risk involved in the development, not
to mention the date on which the system enter service.
Whether overoptimism was the result of deliberate policies
on the part of the sponsoring agency is something of a moot
point. Peck and Scherer, however, did point out that the
practice has been accepted as a matter of fact within the
defense industry.
Quite commonly, this strategy includes submitting
proposals which in one or more aspects are highly
optimistic. Indeed, the propensity to 'but into'
attractive new programs with optimistic quality,
time, and/or cost estimates is perhaps as much as
an industry practice in advanced weapons acquisition
as list price cutting is in automobile retailing, or
as the advertising of loss leaders is in department
store operations.il
Concurrent with the overoptimism that acompanies large
programs, it was presumed that there would be difficulties
encountered in the area of cost control simple because of
program size, an extension of the belief that with size one
inherits waste and a certain amount of uncontrollability
.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to distinguish explicitly
between optimism or waste based on data gathered from the
SAR' s.
2 . Programs with a larger development phase budget
have a greater tendency to achieve initial cost,
performance and schedule estimates .
An acedemic approach to the study of project management has
stressed the importance of "front-end loading" the acquisition
11 Peck, M. J. and Scherer, F. M., The Weapons Acquisition
Process; An Economic Analysis
,
p. 413, Research Division,




effort, citing the lever effect which early commitment of funds
has upon program performance. ^ It would appear reasonable
that programs which enjoy an extensive development period
would suffer the least uncertainty in the expected level of
program outcome, since a greater percentage of the "unknowns"
which plague any program would be uncovered.
3
.
Programs with greater technical risk tend to incur
greater cost and schedule growth than do less risky
programs .
This hypothesis is associated with the second contention in
that programs which represent a great deal of technical risk,
which require a more complex and sophisticated technical
effort (as perceived from the outset of the program) , would
be more susceptible to failure.
4 Multiple-source contracted programs enjoy an advan-
tage in program success over sole-source contracted
programs .
For the purpose of this analysis, those programs which had
more than one prime contractor regardless of whether the
systems were in procurement or development were considered
multiple source programs. In the case of air-craft systems,
if there were competing contractors for either the airframe
or engine designs, the program was considered to have a
"second source". Frederick Sherer in his study of the
economic incentive in the weapons system acquisition process
*•* The effect was originally suggested to this student
by Professor Melvin Kline, U. S. Naval Postgraduate School.
20

documented the significant cost reductions which developed
during the joint production of military aircraft in World
War II. Although not in as much detail as Scherer, Fox
touched upon the benefits of "second sourcing", reporting
that "it would be reasonable to assume a 25% reduction in
contract price can be achieved in many, if not most, cases
when competition is introduced." 13 It would appear that
this is one area in which weapons procurement responds
to traditional market forces. The fourth hypothesis seeks
to determine first, whether the evident cost successes do
exist in a significant number of cases, and second, whether
the advantage of multiple-source contracting is extended
to the areas of performance and schedule.
5. The prospect of program success dimenishes with
increasing maturity among programs .
This last hypothesis was posed in order to test the validity
of the SAR in overcoming the criticisms alluded to earlier
about the noncomparability of programs in differing stages
of their life-cycle. For example, early in the life of a
program, before the realities of the management or technical
task at hand are more apparent, one would expect that current
estimates of project outcomes would agree with initial
assessments. But, as the program achieves greater maturity,
and uncertainties arise, the gap between the two expectations
13 Fox, J. R. , Arming America
,




would be sure to widen.
Each hypothesis was tested using a one-tailed Mann-
Whitney U Test (a nonparametric one way analyses of variance)
in which the means of program outcomes were compared. For
the most part, the sample of 48 programs would be divided
along the median of the program variable in question, except
in the case of the fifth hypothesis where whether a program
was in development or procurement became the classifying
criterion. The results of these tests are presented in
Chapter III.
2. Correlation
As stated earlier, associated with the hypothesis testing
was a desire to examine the correlation between the output
variables of cost, performance and schedule, and initial
program estimates of program length, cost and technical risk
when specific program characteristics were controlled for
explicitly. The thesis employed a nonparametric correlation
proceudre offered as a subprogram in SPSS: Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences by Norman H. Nie, et al.
The following characteristics were considered and controlled
for in deriving correlations between program outcomes and
initial estimates:
1. All forty-eight programs together without any
differentiation;
2. Programs differentiated by the maturity of their
design (i.e., whether the program was in development or
22

had advanced to procurement)
;
4. Programs differentiated by system type, ship,
aircraft, missile or miscellaneous (tracked vehicles,
fire-control systems, etc.);
5. Programs differentiated by service sponsor, Navy,
Army, or Air Force.
The first category of 'undifferentiated programs' was
included as a control feature to serve as a means of com-
parison for the following four program characteristics.
Items two and three were included as part of follow-up tests
to the verification of the fourth and fifth hypotheses.
The last two program characteristics, system type and service
sponsor, were included because they are frequently used as
means of ordering weapons systems. Also, there are sub-
stantial inter-service differences in system acquisition,
and as a result, there are natural, virtually instinctive
inclinations to make comparisons between the programs of
each service.
Additionally, the intercorrelations among program out-
comes were examined to see if any light could be shed on the
trade-offs between cost, performance and schedule. The
correlation results are presented in Chapter III.
C. SELECTION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
1 . Program Cost
For the purpose of the analysis, it was considered
essential that each of the forty-eight programs be considered
23

on an equal footing, that is, considered from the same base
year. In this way, comparability between programs on the
basis of total program cost would be maintained. The base
year selected was 1974 since all but two programs (added late
in the thesis) predated that year. Each of the programs
reported development estimate program costs in their own
base year dollars, which in turn were converted to 1974
dollars. The method of accomplishing this conversion was
not very satisfactory, but had to suffice for lack of a
superior alternative. From a Direct Budget Plan (TOA)
History for the Department of the Navy, an implicit price
deflator for the fiscal year 1964 through 1977 was derived.
The unsatisfactory aspects of this source are evident when
one considers that the TOA history included nonprocurement
appropriations- such as OM&N as well as the procurement
related appropriations, RDT&E, SCN, etc. The U. S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis is in the process of determining
deflators for each of the basic defense industries, but
results will not be forthcoming until late 1977.
A copy of the TOA history and an example of the manner
in which the implicit price deflators for each of the
program base years was derived is provided in Appendix B.
2. Program Unit Cost
Unit cost was selected as an independent variable
on the assumption that program success (primarily in the
area of cost) could not be adequately explained by program
24

size -alone. For example, a program line the A^-7E in which
the Navy is procurring a proven aircraft design with up-
dated avionics, and the F-14A program which represents a
completely new weapon system, could have conceivably identical
program costs provided sufficient quantities of the A-7E
were purchased. However, the true nature of both programs
would be obscured. Of the two, clearly the F-14A with a
program unit cost of $16. 8M (1974$) is the more ambitious
undertaking, and the lesser unit cost of the A-7E, $4.1M
in 1974 dollars, would reflect this. As in the case of
program cost, development estimates of unit costs were
translated into 1974 dollars.
3 . Development Investment
The development investment for each program was
derived as the ratio of the level of development spending
to total program as foreseen at DSARC II. No judgement of
the manner of (or purpose for) development spending was
attempted. The variable was intended to serve as a com-
plement to program unit cost, that is, a measure of the
technological advance of the project. Some difficulties
were encountered in those reports for nuclear powered
men-of-war where propulsion system development costs
attributed to both the Navy and the Energy Research Devel-
opment Agency (ERDA) were not included in the cost section
of the SAR's, but rather in a SAR addendum. Consequently,
at first glance a project as large and complex as NIMITZ
25

(CVAN 68) appears to be an off-the-shelf product, despite
the fact that her two reactor propulsion plant represents
a first for the surface Navy and is hardly a trivial tech-
nological step. Adjustments were made for cases such as
this by adding the additional estimated development cost
to both the level of development funding and the total
program cost.
4 . Program Length
Of all the explanatory variables, time was the most
subjectively determined. Initial program length, measured
ostensibly from the initiation of the project to an initial
operational capability date (IOC) proved to be a bit
troublesome to extract from the SAR's. Earlier researchers
have encountered similar problems.
Time of availability predictions are often made in
terms of an 'initial operational capability 1, - a
decidedly qualitative concept. Does one missile
on a lonely launch pad constitute an 'initial opera-
tional capability'? Or do 3 missiles when their
reliability in time of need is doubtful?^ 4
Fortunately, the term IOC is a common one within DOD and in
a large number of cases, those dates were reported explicitly.
In the case of Navy shipbuilding programs, a simplifying
rule was established whereby the date on which the lead ship
of the entire class in question became available for
14 Peck, M. J. and Scherer, F. M., The Weapons Acquisition
Process: An Economic Analysis
, p. 20, Research Division,




operational deployment was chosen arbitrarily as the "IOC"
date. There are obvious draw-backs to this method when the
entire class is considered as any student of ship construc-
tion can point out. Namely, the greatest schedule slippages
often occur during follow-ship production. Still, the
availability of the lead ship does represent the realization
of a design, and in order to maintain some parity with other
systems produced more rapidly, the consistency of the above
method was considered essential.
The other end-point of program length, the initiation
of the project, was even more difficult to determine. In
most cases, a date corresponding to the advent of the system
life-cycle was selected as the starting point. More often
than not, this date was the date of approval for the system
requirements/characteristics. There was a distinct lack of
uniformity noted among the various programs in the reporting
of this schedule milestone. In a few cases programs were
considered underway with an all inclusive 'commenced
engineering development' or 'initiated validation phase'.
D. SELECTION OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES
1. Cost Growth Factor
Fortunately, a recent revision of the SAR system
directed that development and current cost estimates be
reported in constant year dollars as well as in escalated
figures. This change has made the pinpointing of true cost
growth that much easier. It came as something of a shock
27

to discover that little or no provision for escalation was
included in the development estimate of many programs.
Where some accounting for escalation was made, invariably
the inflation rate was unrealistically low.
The office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) publishes a "SAR Program Acquisition Cost
Summary" (see Appendix C) once each quarter's collection of
individual reports is complete. Prom this summary it is
possible to determine each program's cost growth both in
dollars and as a percentage of original estimates. In each
instance, the resultant figures are adjusted by OSD analysts
to negate the effects of inflation and program quantity
changes. Unfortunately, the relative measure of program
cost growth is related def initionally to the original
program cost estimate as shown below.
Cost growth (%) = Cost Changes
Development Estimate + Quantity Changes
(All entries are in base
year dollars)
One would expect a negative correlation between cost growth
(%) and program size, expressed above as the 'development
estimate 1 . The extent of the correlation would depend on the
degree to which the Cost and Quantity Changes varied with
total program cost. To aid in clarifying the effect of
program size on cost success, it would be helpful to have the
assistance of an absolute measure of growth, namely Cost
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Growth ($) which is the dollar value of the overrun. This
measure is determined as shown below.
Cost Growth ($) = Cost Growth (%) -1 x Development
Estimate
Hence, a negative "growth" would indicate an underrun.
2. Performance Achievement Factor
Navy and Air Force concepts of system effectiveness
were presented in the 1960 's as a measure of how well a
system performed its intended function. This figure of
merit was derived originally as a companior to cost effective-
ness in the hope that together the two would serve to deter-
mine whether a system undergoing design would satisfy most
efficiently those operational requirements which spawned it
in the first place. Despite interservice differences in the
wording of what was meant by system effectiveness, the
measure (expressed as a probability) was generally conceeded
to have three basic components;
1. the performance capability of the system;
2. the operational readiness or availability
that is, its ability to start performance of a
mission when called upon to do so;
3. the continued capability of the system to
perform, or its mission reliability or dependa -
bility .
In time however, it became apparent that models of system
effectiveness were not as useful as originally conceived.
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The computations were messy and highly subjective. For
example, how much does the failure of a single component
degrade the effectiveness of a system? Or even more basic,
what constitutes a failure? Since the derived probabilities
were by no means "hard numbers'', they were mistrusted by
managers, and the computational aspects of system effective-
ness fell into disuse.
Given that an evaluation of system performance is essential
to any analysis of program success, and in the absense of a
readily available performance factor counterpart to cost
growth, a simplistic method of marking performance using the
three basic elements of system effectiveness where possible
was devised. From SAR data on the technical/operational
characteristics of the system in question, it was possible
to contrast current estimates of system performance with
development estimates. Generally speaking, the performance
achievement factor was determined by assessing a weighted
average of major performance areas such as speed, time-on-
station, maintainability, system accuracy, etc. A value of
performance less than 1.0 indicates that the system achieved
better results than originally estimated. An example of how
this computation was made is provided in Appendix C.
3. Schedule Overrun Factor
As in the case of attaining performance goals, the
schedule overrun factor was determined by the ratio of
current to development estimates of program length. However,
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like cost growth (%) , shcedule slippage (%) is related
inversely to program length.




Hence, a negative correlation would be expected. To minimize
this dependency, a fifth output variable, schedule slippage
(months) was introduced. In a similar fashion as cost
growth ($) , this variable measures the actual slippage of the





Appendix C has listed those programs from which program
data was obtained for the analysis. With the exception of
POSEIDON, all the programs are currently included under the
SAR system. (POSEIDON reports were terminated in June 1975
following completion of system deployment and the subsequent
disestablishment of the program office) . For the convenience
of the reader, the programs are ordered by service sponsor.
An examination of the outcome means for each service indicates
that perhaps Navy programs enjoyed a greater achieved per-
formance at greater cost and shcedule growth than did Army
and Air Force projects. A sample comparison between outcome
means revealed that the NAVY - USAF differences in all three
categories were significant, while the pertinent ARMY - NAVY
disparity was limited to the area of cost alone.
The results of the NAVY - USAF comparison are not fully
understood. Sample comparisons of Navy programs (less ship
systems) and the Air Force projects shown did result in less
significant cost differences. Additionally, when missile
systems (which historically have proven to be technically
more successful than other system types) were excluded from
both samples, the performance difference between services
was still evident. No explanation for this is readily
apparent, nor was there any system type peculiar to a
single service that could account for the Air Force advantage
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in meeting deployment schedules
B. HYPOTHESIS TESTING
1 . Large programs have a tendency to incur greater cost
and schedule growth than do smaller programs .
Table 3-1 displays the difference in the means of
program outcomes between large and small projects. The column
marked 'significance' indicates the degree to which the
differences were statistically significant. In instances of
no significance, the column entry is NS . Subsequent tables
in this section are arranged similarly,
TABLE 3-1
COMPARISON OF PROGRAMS BASED ON PROGRAM SIZE
LARGER PROGRAMS























Cost Growth ($) 163. 7M
The results appear to provide mixed support for the first
hypothesis. Ignoring the differences in relative cost growth
for reasons given in Chapter II, note the differences in
schedule overrun. Historically, larger programs have done
significantly better in meeting original schedules, both in
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a relative and absolute sense. The lack of significance
observed in the area of achieved performance is a result
that will be repeated elsewhere in this chapter. Overall,
the nonparametric analyses of variance were ineffectual in
accounting for the variance in system performance.
In the area of cost growth ($), larger programs 'did not
appear to hold the line against overruns. The reasons for
this may have included a tendency for the managers of large
(and therefore important) programs to throw money at
problems, particularly schedule problems, until a solution
is found. Once a major program has been funded, rarely
has it had to do without additional resources if required.
2. Programs with more development funding have a greater




COMPARISON OF PROGRAMS ON BASIS OF LEVEL
OF DEVELOPMENT FUNDING
HIGHER PROGRAMS SIGNIFICANCE LOWER PROGRAMS
Cost Growth (%) 1.15 0.040 Cost Growth (%) 1.27
Performance 0.99 NS Performance 1.0Q
Schedule Slip 1.24 0.002 Schedule Slip 1.42
(%) (%)
Schedule Slip 15.94 NS Schedule Slip 21.7
(Mos.) (Mos.)




Perhaps the most important comparison in Table 3 - 2 is that
which contrasts relative cost growth. During the analysis
of program data, a very high (0.750-1.000) positive corre-
lation was found to exist between program cost and develop-
ment funding in a significant number of cases. It was likely
that the two were measuring essentially the same character-
istic, program size. Thus, one would expect Tables 3-1 and
3 - 2 to bear a resemblance to one another. In terms of
relative cost growth and schedule slippage, this similarity
exists. What is crucial about the results of this second
sample comparison is that the level of development funding
has a significant negative impact on relative cost growth.
Bearing in mind that the development cost is also an indirect
measure of program size, this is the first instance of an
indication, not confounded by definitions of the variables,
that suggests program size may inhibit the degree of cost
growth. Further signs of the efficacy of early and sub-
stantial investments are the differences in relative schedule
slippage and the absence of any significance to the difference
between the absolute cost growth for each sample.
3. Programs with perceived technical risks tend to incur





COMPARISON OF PROGRAMS ON
BASIS OF DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT
HIGHER PROGRAMS SIGNIFICANCE
Cost Growth (%) 1.18 NS
Performance 0.97 NS
Schedule Slip 1.32 NS
(%)
Schedule Slip 19.4 NS
(Mos. )
LOWER PROGRAMS









Cost Growth ($) 3 4 9. 8M NS Cost Growth ($) 34 0.3M
The weakness of development investment as a explanatory
variable is apparent in Table 3-3. No significance can
be attributed to the difference in outcomes between programs
with a higher development/committment and those with less.
A second comparison between the extremes of each group, the
highest and lowest quartiles, was made with similar null
results.
4. Multiple-source contracted programs enjoy an advan-





COMPARISON OF PROGRAMS ON BASIS OF
PRODUCTION/DEVELOPMENT SOURCES
SOLE-SOURCE





















Cost Growth ($) 103. 4M
The findings of Peck and Scherer were sustained by the Mann-
Whitney test. In terms of relative and absolute cost growth,
second-source programs did better than their sole-source
counterparts. " Although a small class of projects (7) , the
multiple source programs included Army and Navy projects of
all system types. In regard to the achieved performance of
both program types, this study found no significance in the
difference of program outcomes. This is at variance with the
findings of Rubin and Marquis 1 who determined that "sole source
contractors do significantly better technically than contrac-
tors who were selected by some form of competitive procedure."-'-"
Rubin and Marquis 1 study is not precisely comparable to the
16 Sloan, Alfred P., School of Management, Massachussetts
Institute of Technology, Report #192-66, Critical Decisions in
the Initiation of Development Projects , Rubin, I. M. and
Marquis', D. G., June 1966
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one undertaken here in that only development projects in
which the technical performance was evaluated subjectively
by management and engineering personnel, were considered.
However, the contention that greater technical performance
can be achieved in the absence of competition was not
supported.
5. The prospect of program success diminishes with
increasing maturity among programs
TABLE 3 - 5 (A)
COMPARISON OF PROGRAMS BASED
ON LIFE-CYCLE DIFFERENCES
PROGRAMS IN PROCUREMENT SIGNIFICANCE






















Cost Growth ($) 213. 9M
Table 3-5 (a) reveals that on a gross level the SAR is able to
minimize the differences among programs that arise because
of life cycle disparities. With the exception of program
growth in dollars, programs in procurement and those still in
development exhibited similar success. The exception of
program growth is indicative that either uncertainties in
schedule or producibility do still exist, and that the
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development phase has not been completely successful in
identifying and costing these aspects of the system. It is
felt that the lack of significance between the two categor-
ies can be attributed to allowing the SAR development
estimate to be reviewed and updated when required once a
production contact has been let.
In the event that differences within groups were obscured
by combination, the development and procurement classes were
again divided, in the development cast by the age of the
program, and in the case of procurement by whether the system
had reached IOC. These two groups were then compared and
the results presented in Table 3-5 (b).
TABLE 3 - 5(B)
COMPARISON OF PROGRAMS BASED ON
LIFE-CYCLE DIFFERENCES
PROGRAMS AT/PAST IOC SIGNIFICANCE























Cost Growth ($) 26 6. 5M
The results were generally supportive of those shown in
Table 3 - 5(a). Once again the difference in cost growth
is significant; however, the difference in the means of
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achieved performance was unexpected. One possible explana-
tion is that the realities of a fully operational deployment
might test system capabilities better than a formal evalua-
tion period, principally in the important areas of relia-
bility and maintainability. On balance, the findings in
Tables 3 - 5(a) and 3 - 5(b) supported the contention that
the SAR in its present form does overcome sufficiently the
difficulties in comparing programs at various stages of
completeness.
C. CORRELATION
The results of the nonparametric correlation are presented
in Tables 3-6 through 3 - 10(c). Overall, the results are
not impressive. To be sure, there were individual cases in
which the controlled characteristic produced effective
results. For example, missile programs displayed an across-
the-board effectiveness in predicting success. (See Table
3-7 (b) ) . Why this is true of missile systems and not ships
is not readily apparent. For whatever reason, there is a
greater homogeneity among missile programs than among other
groupings. Perhaps then, one could suggest that greater
faith could be placed in the initial estimates of missile
program success to the extent that they are valid indicators
of future results. Characteristic, however, of the analysis
was the finding of less than 50% of the correlations as
significant. And, when those variable pairs with definitional
relationships are discounted, the results are even more
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nebulous. Additionally, the whole purpose of ordering
systems by some specialized criterion variable to isolate
the effects of program determinants is called into question
when one recognizes that the category of "all programs"
exhibited a greater number of significant correlations than
a majority of the other instances when a program character-
istic, like service sponsor, was controlled. Actually, the
taxonomic analysis was weakened further by disparities in
sample size among some of the classes of programs. The
greatest difference was noted between the sole-source
contracted programs (40) and multiple-source contracted
programs (7) . It is not unexpected that those categories
had by comparison more significant results than their smaller
counterparts, since greater sample size lowers the level at











Performance Cost Cost Schedule Schedule
Factor Growth Growth Slip Slip
Factor Factor Factor Factor








-0.2611 0.1430 -0.1668 -0.0682
(0.038)
-0.3488 0.4549 -0.5408 -0.3892
(0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
-0.1415 -0.0964 -0.0746 -0.0608
0.2822 -0.2763 0.0999 -0.3898 -0.0664
(0.027) (0.032) (0.004)
* Entries in parentheses indicate
level to which Spearman correla-
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N/A 0.0890 -0.2447 0.4120 0.5297
(G.071)
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No correlations with achieve^ performance were possible because each





TABLE 3 - 7(C)
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
Cost Cost
Growth (?.) Growth ($
Schedule Schedule















0.2381 0.0551 0.5062 0.4285
(0.032) (0.063)














Achievement Growth (%) Growth ( S]
Schedule Schedule
Slip (%) Slip (Mos.)







-0.0286 1.0000 -0.8000 -0.6000
(0.001) (0.052)
-0.0357 0.2571 -0.3000 0.1000

























































TA3LE 3 - 8(B)
MULTIPLE-SOURCE CONTRACTED PROGRAMS
Performance Cost Cost Schedule























-0.2143 0.3571 -0.1786 -0.0714













TABLE 3 - 9(A)
PROGRAMS IN PROCUREMENT
Performance Cost Cost
Achievement Growth (%) Growth ($!
Schedule Schedule

























































































TABLE 3 - 10(A)
NAVY PROGRAMS
Performance Cost Cost
Achievement Growth ("'.) Growth ($!
Schedule Schedule
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-0.1506 -0.1084 -0.6177 0.0501
(0.012)
Mean Outcomes
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Table 3-6 has displayed the correlation results for all
forty-eight programs without any differentiation. The
strength of program cost in determining schedule success is
apparent by the significance levels of the correlations
(0.001 and 0.003). Table 3-7 reveals the superiority of
the missile system correlation over the other system types.
Eleven out of eighteen valid correlations were significant
in the case of missile programs, while ship systems produced
but five. Oddly enough, aircraft systems with a larger sample
size than ship systems had only four significant correlations.
Apparently, aircraft systems were responding to other deter-
inants, most probably managerial in origin.
Despite the great difference in sample size note pre-
viously, multi-source programs and sole-source programs pro-
duced very nearly the same number of significant correlations.
(See Table 3-8). In the case of the second source programs,
the lack of impact on the part of program cost on absolute
cost growth rioted earlier was suprising, thereby suggesting
that cost benefits do occur as the result of competition. In
common with multi-source contracted programs, developing
programs reflected a decreasing level of performance with
increasing technical risk. This expected result was
curiously not demonstrated elsewhere. The differences
between service programs discussed earlier are exhibited in
Table 3 - 10. Not suprisingly, with a larger sample size,
Navy programs produced more significant correlations than
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either of the other services 1 programs combined.
Table 3-11 represents a summary of the statistically
significant ( 0.100) tests presented in Tables 3-7 through
3 - 10, showing the degree to which variable relationships
were common regardless of the controlled program character-
istic. Similarily, Table 3-12 displays a summary of the
correlation (not shown) of dependent variables with them-










































































The results of the correlation analysis as summarized in
the above tables illustrate some interesting points. The
first of these is the weakness of the independent variable,
development investment. Construed as a measure of tech-
nological risk, the variable failed to correlate with any of
the outcomes except in a few cases. One of two conclusions
can be reached, either the program charactersitic of risk
is valid and the variable as defined did not capture it, or
risk has little or no effect on program outcome. It is
















reported by Peck and Scherer.17 Also, on reflection, it is
felt that the data as presented in the SAR's could not be
manipulated otherwise to measure risk.
Much the same criticism can be directed toward the use
of program unit cost. With the exception of relative cost
growth, unit cost did little to explain program outcomes.
The fact that unit cost did correlate significantly with
relative cost growth in six out of a possible twelve cases
was unexpected. The variable was intended initially to
support development investment as a measure of the complex-
ity of the program. Intuitively one would expect that the
relationship between unit cost and cost growth (%) to be a
positive one, not negative. It is suspected that unit cost
may be reflective of an unknown project feature.
From Table 3 - 12, a summary of the correlations between
dependent variables reveals that a definite relationship
between cost and schedule growth exists, perhaps more aptly
put as "time is money". As in the case of the analysis
involving both dependent and independent variables, perfor-
mance achievement remained a largely unexplained outcome,
although in 6 of 11 trials, a significant negative correla-
tion between relative cost growth and performance was report-
ed. It may be hasty to say that a desire to reach or surpass
initial performance levels causes cost overruns since a
17 Peck, M. J. and Scherer, F. M., The Weapons Acquisi-
tion Process: An Economic Analysis, Chapter 16, Research




corresponding relationship between performance and cost
growth in dollars was not evident. The overwhelming
number of significant correlations between relative and
absolute cost overruns, and schedule slippages must be
discounted on definitional grounds.
D. CONCLUSIONS
From the results of the hypothesis testing, three
major conclusions have been derived.
1. Contrary to previous belief, large, expensive
programs exhibited a greater controllability in terms
of schedule than did projects of smaller size .
One possible explanation is that large, expensive pro-
grams attract a great amount of attention from every quarter,
the sponsoring service itself, OSD, Congress and the public.
Conceivably, greater pressure are brought to bear to keep
large programs within the limits of an original assessment
as suggested -by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, and thereby
avoid the embarassment of adverse program outcomes. A
second reason (and one not necessarily exclusive of the
first) might be that large programs, because of their size
and sensitivity, are subject to greater scrutiny before the
projects get underway, and thus the original estimates are
more realistic. Also, once underway, program offices may
find themselves more adequately staffed both in numbers of
people and their expertise to ensure success.
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2. Despite indications that early and substantial
funding may reduce the scope of future cost growth
,
there is little clearcut effect of "front-end" money on
the technical and operational outcomes of the program .
Although no judgements were made of the manner in which
development funds were spent, there are indications that
the management of the development/system definition phase
of the life-cycle should be redirected. The staff report on
the acquisition process to the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel in
197 reported that the services had failed to receive
sufficient funding to carry out necessary technical work
during the early periods of their programs. What would often
happen then was that critical engineering studies would be
conducted during the production phase when money was more
abundant. It is plausible that an adverse effect on system
capabilities and performance would be suffered.
Related to this last point is the complete lack of effect
that development investment displayed when defined as a
ratio of development funding to program cost. It may be
entirely possible that the definition of development invest-
ment is inadequate to the task of measuring technical
uncertainty. Despite the fact that a majority of programs
(40 out of 48) met or surpassed the initial performance goals
established for them, and that the "science" of predicting
what is technically feasible may be more efficient than the
"art" of estimating cost or schedule outcomes, one should
be reluctant to surmise that developmental effort has less
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effect on project success than other program variables.
Although certainly less program resources are committed
to advancing the state-of-the-art than manufacturing final
hardware, judging from figures for the cost growth of
strictly development budgets as reported by Peck and Scherer,
cost variance has exceeded three or four times the original
estimates in the past. It is conceivable that these develop-
mental excesses could have a snowballing effect of the
remainder of the program, expecially on schedule milestones
if stirct measures against concurrent development and pro-
duction are taken.
3 . Program length is related inversely to the achieve-
ment goals .
It appears from an examination of all the characteristics
that performance estimates were either met or exceeded, and
so it is surprising to find indications that program length
is related in a positive way to achievement of desired
performance. Peck and Scherer came across a possible explan-
ation in their study.
Each engineer wants to perfect things on which he
works. Every development nevertheless involves
compromises between quality- and time. If schedules
are set too generously, there is a tendency for
persons working on the progect to use up the sche-
duled time and still be no nearer completion on
their hardware goals than under a shorter schedule.
Therefore, in order to provide a good target a
schedule should be short enough to make people think
56

and worry about getting the hardware out. 18
Unfortunately, program length contributed very little else to
an understanding of program success.
18 Peck, M. J. and Scherer, F. M., The Weapons Acquisition
Process: An Economic Process , p. 413, Research Division,




IV. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Fundamental to this thesis was the point of view from
which the analysis was conducted. Each of the forty-eight
programs were considered as "black boxes" into which certain
inputs were made (cost, time, effort, etc.) and from which
certain measurable outputs were collected. Meadows and
Marquis criticized such "post mortem" techniques in their
own analysis of the implications of forecasting errors for
ignoring the interaction between forecasts and outcomes in
the process of development. 19 Additionally, Determinants
of Project Success by Murphy, et al, stated, "with rare
exception, the determinants of project success were manage -
ment factors, things which management had the potential
ability to inf luence. . .
"
, 20 a conclusion which necessarily
required a point of view from within the box.
The analysis undertaken here does not mean to suggest
that management techniques are without effect in determining
program outcomes. Instead, the study asked how program
initial conditions related to program outcomes, or more
precisely, to what extent could the initial conditions be
Meadows, D. L. and Marquis, D. G., Characteristics
and Implications of Forecasting Errors in the Selection of
R&D Projects
,
paper delivered by D . L. Meadows at The
Second Annual Technology and Management Conference, Washing-
ton, D.C., 21 March 1968
20 Murphy, D. C, Baker, B. N. , and Fisher, D,, Deter-
minants of Project Success , p. 5, Management Institute,
School of Management, Boston College, 1974
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relied upon to "explain" program success. 'Explain* is
used here in the sense of signalling the degree of success
that a program most likely would enjoy. And because of
that, Meadows and Marquis are correct, the transfer function
of the black box is not really of primary concern. Actually,
the results of this study do uphold Murphy in that the
weakness of the correlation implies that other determinants
are at work.
Before dismissing the methodology as indecisive at best,
perhaps a few suggestions as to how to improve it would be
in order. During the accumulation of data for the thesis,
a concerted effort was made to ascertain a measure of the
relative importance of each project without success. The
Navy practice of assigning importance classification based
on the significance of the preceived threat to program once
the Specific Operational Requirement has been drafted is no
longer in effect, and no joint ranking system appears to
exist. The addition of this extra variable as a measure of
how the program is perceived outside the project office
would strengthen greatly the correlation prodedure and no
doubt serve as the basis for an interesting hypothesis as
well.
It is felt that the data from the SAR should be supple-
mented by information gained from other sources, such as
interviews or questionaires . For instance, the dilemma as
to what effect technological advance has on project success
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could be settled by correlating the technical assessment of
program office engineering personnel with the SAR measure-
ment. Additionally, some understanding of how initial
forecasts drive the program, that is how the attitude of
managers toward these development estimates is reflected in
the outcome, might prove an interesting variable in itself.
Obviously though, the distance between the analyst and the
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COMPUTATION OF IMPLICIT PRICE DEFLATORS
The Direct Budget Plan (TOA) History (following page)
was the source of the implicit price deflators discussed
earlier. The following example will demonstrate how these
conversion factors were derived.
A - 7E Program
From the SAR in Appendix A, the program base
year is established as 1967. Then, from the TOA history,
the ratio of FY 1967 obligations to an equivalent amount of
1977 dollars is computed. This is:
$21,190M/$42,904M = 0.493
Similarily, a ratio of FY 1974 obligations to 1977 dollars
is also calculated. This is:
$26,888M/$32,926M = 0,817
The second ratio is then divided by the first and the result
is a price deflator for converting 1967 dollar amounts to an
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COMPUTATION OF OUTCOME VARIABLES
Listed in the following pages are the forty-eight programs
which constituted the sample of acquisition programs studied
and their associated outcomes. Before proceeding further,
it was felt that some examples of how each of the outcome
factors was obtained would be beneficial. The A-7E SAR in
Appendix A will serve as a data source,
1. Cost Growth (%)
As stated previously in Chapter II, the measure of
relative cost growth was obtained directly from "SAR Program
Acquisition Cost Summary" . That document reported the A-7E
project relative cost growth as + 26%. Thus, the program has
a cost growth- factor of 1.26.
2. Performance
In Chapter II, the achieved performance factor is
stated as being derived as a weighted average of key per-
formance criteria. In the case of the A-7E program, these
were:
1. maximum speed at sea level;




a. Scheduled Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM)
b. Maintenance Man-Hour per Flight Hour.
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A comparison of the current estimate/demonstrated performance
and the development estimate for each of the criteria above
yields the following results.
1. 505 KTS/555 KTS =0.91
2. 537 NM/475 NM = 1.13
3. 35,500 ft/35,000 ft = 1.00
4. 0.78/0.84 - 0.93
5a. 24 MOS/30 MOS = 0.80
b. 5.4 HR/9.6 HR = 0.56
(Weighted equally, maintainability
is 0.68)
Summing all of the scores and dividing by the number of
criteria, one achieves a performance factor of 0,93 for the
program.
The above procedure is illustrative of the general
approach used. There were two modifications to this method,
one in the case of ships, the other in the case of certain
one-shot devices. Unlike aircraft where speed, maneuver-
ability, range, reliability and maintainability taken toge-
ther represent a meaningful measure of system performance,
a comparison of SAR criteria for ships (e.g., speed, manning
level, displacement, etc.) does not. Invariably these
criteria are met. The existence of multiple mission areas for
a single ship type further complicates the figure of merit
calculations. This is a good example of where system
ewectiveness breaks down in a computational sense. For these
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reasons, ship systems were arbitrarily assigned a performance
factor of 1.0.
One-shot systems (less strategic systems) were evaluated
based on a comparison of their single shot probability of
kill given in the SAR. This assumed the systems were activated
within their proper search/attack envelopes and that all
components functioned properly.
3. Schedule Growth (%)
From the Schedule Milestone section of the SAR, the
program was initiated in May 1963 and achieved an IOC on
schedule in April 1970. Thus, there was no schedule slippage
and a factor of 1.0 was awarded.
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PROGRAM OUTCOME SUMMARY BY SERVICE
NAVY
Program Performance Cost Growth (%) Schedule Slip(%)
1. S-3A 1.04 1.03 1.00
2. Trident 1.00 0.99 1.14
3. Poseidon C-3 1.00 N/A 1.07
4. SSN 688 1.00 1.01 1.15
5. Trident C-4 1. 00 1.06 1.13
6. DD 963 1.00 1.05 1.24
7. CGN 3 8 1.00 1.05 1.24
8. Harpoon 1.00 1.10 1.13
9. LHA 1.00 1.18 1.87
10. CVAN 68 1.00 1.16 1.35
11. CVAN 69 1.00 1.25 1.24
12. Condor 0.94 1.46 3.29
13. CH-53E 0.97 1.08 1.32
14. MK 48-1 . . 0.98 1.19 1.14
15. P-3C 0.99 1.17 1.05
16. Captor 1. 00 1.56 1.33
17. Sparrow III 1.00 1.64 2.80
18. PHM 1.00 1.84 1.41
t
19. Phoenix 1.00 1.43 1.06
20. FFG 7 1.00 1,45 1.13
21. A-7E 0.93 1.26 1.00
22. E-2C 0.89 1.36 1.03
84

Program Performance Cost Growth (%) Schedule Slip(%)
23. Phalanx 0.85 1.37 1.36











































Program Performance Cost Growth ( %
)
Schedule Slip(%)
1. F-16 1.06 1.00 1.00
2. B-l 1.12 1.13 1.35
3. A-10 1.03 1.22 1.13
4. E-3A 1.02 1.16 1.10
5. EF-11A 1.00 0.94 1.00
6. Maverick 1.00 1.02 1.22
7. E-4 1.00 1.40 1.61
8. F-14 1.00 1.25 1.03
9. Minuteinan III 0.82 1.15 1.00
MEA] 1.006 1.141 1.160
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